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I. Introduction
The World Trade Organization's (WTO) Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) was
created by the WTO signatories in the Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU). The DSB has the responsibility to
oversee the WTO dispute settlement system. Because of the large number of dis-
putes brought before the WTO in the first three years, the DSB has been the focus
of much of the public attention received by the WTO. Although there has been a
good amount of praise for the apparent successes of the dispute settlement system,
certain Members have raised concerns regarding how the system is working.
In 1998, Members of the WTO will undertake a review of the DSU and address
some of the problems and concerns that have arisen in the first three years. The
Members will have to identify what aspects of the system, if any, are problematic
and then try to achieve consensus on how such problems should be addressed.
Since the inception of the WTO, the dispute settlement system has received
118 requests for consultations on eighty-three distinct matters. Presently, eighteen
cases at various stages in the dispute settlement process exist.'
The large number of disputes have addressed a wide range of issues over a broad
spectrum including challenges in new areas such as Trade Related Aspects of Intel-
lectual Property and Services (TRIPS) (e.g., India-Patents), the WTO Agree-
ments, and GATT 1994 Articles. Some of these disputes concern issues of major
commercial importance to the countries involved. Other disputes involve issues
that are politically charged because of health, national security, or other reasons.
*Terence P. Stewart is Managing Partner, Stewart and Stewart, Washington, DC.
**Mara M. Burr is an Associate with Stewart and Stewart, Washington, DC.
1. WTO Secretariat, Overview and State of Play of WTO Disputes (Feb. 13, 1998).
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Looking at the number of disputes that have gone to panels,2 the complexity
of the legal and factual issues being presented in the cases, the large number of
countries with interests in some of the proceedings, and the interest of the private
sector in having their views known, one may ask whether there are areas in the
panel process that should be reexamined as part of the WTO review process
taking place in 1998. The short answer is yes.
II. Some Initial Observations
Dispute settlement is, of course, only one of the tools available to WTO Mem-
bers to sort out concerns over actions of trading partners. Historically, GATT
Contracting Parties were very selective in the matters on which consultations
were sought and eventual disputes taken. The large number of requests for consul-
tations in the first three years of the WTO appears to reflect a significant shifting
of attention and resources to the formal dispute settlement process. Many in
Geneva seem to echo the view that there is an increased legalization of the relation-
ship between nations within the WTO. As the tables in later sections show, there
continues to be a concentration of cases by and against the major trading nations.
However, developing countries are increasing their involvement in the process.
Indeed, the first matter brought to the DSB was a matter between two developing
countries. Nor is it the case that all disputes are unwelcome by the country being
challenged. Administrations in various countries may have difficulties getting
legislative bodies to bring national laws into conformity with WTO obligations.
Challenges within the WTO may provide the political cover for legislatures ac-
cepting changes to national laws that are highly unpopular at home.
The importance of a matter to a participating country will vary based on the
amount of trade involved; the relative importance of the good, service, or intellec-
tual property issue within the domestic economy of the countries; and the political
considerations that may exist, regardless of the trade volumes involved. The
perceived importance of the matter within the WTO will include the above consid-
erations as well as the novelty/centrality of the issue, public emotions, and the
number of trading partners involved.
For example, the disputes concerning the European Communities Banana Re-
gime3 and European Communities Measures Affecting Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones)4 were viewed as major cases because of the amount of trade involved,
2. See Terence P. Stewart & Mara M. Burr, The WTO's First Two and a Half Years of Dispute
Resolution, 23 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. (Summer 1998).
3. European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas,
WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/GTM, WT/DS27/R/HND, WT/DS27/R/MEX, WT/DS27/R/USA
(May 22, 1997) [hereinafter EC-Bananas] (visited July 5, 1998) < http://www.wto.org/wto/online/
ddf.htm > [hereinafter WTO Websitel.
4. EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, (Hormones) Complaints by the United
States and Canada, WT/DS26/12, WT/DS48/10 (Jan. 16, 1998), at WTO Website, supra note 3
[hereinafter EC-Hormones or Beef Hormones].
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the importance of the trade to many of the participants, and the importance the
parties attached to the issues raised in the disputes. In contrast, the dispute between
the United States and Europe over the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
Act 5 implicates a relatively minor amount of trade but is a major case because
of the importance of the law to the U. S. Congress and the fallout to the trading
system that might result if the panel ruled against the United States. 6
Many of the disputes may not involve a great amount of trade but still are
politically sensitive to the country being challenged. A particular dispute may
implicate the environmental, health, or other important policy of the challenged
country. The Shrimp-Turtle7 dispute fits this description.
Some early observations about the functioning of panels in the WTO include
the following: 1) "major" cases are more likely to require substantial amounts
of time beyond the DSU schedule (time taken has been roughly twice the suggested
time line); to date, virtually all the disputes have been appealed (although the
Japan-Film case, a "major" case, will apparently not be appealed) and appeals
have been broad based; and 2) all disputes take up substantial amounts of institu-
tional resources, although "major" cases will involve those resources for longer
periods of time; 3) the Appellate Body has frequently reversed legal construction
of panels; and 4) the complexity and novelty of cases examined coupled with
time pressures has led to both panels and the Appellate Body to be creative in
considering procedures in the panel and Appellate Body process.
III. Pressure on the WTO Staff
In approximately the last year, the Secretariat staff in Geneva has been stretched
thin in terms of staffing the various disputes. At one point, it was reported that
all attorneys within the WTO, regardless of division, had been deployed to deal
with ongoing panels. Attorneys within the Legal Affairs Division are generally
involved in a number of disputes simultaneously and the workload on these indi-
viduals is understood to be extraordinarily heavy. Thus, an obvious issue is
whether sufficient resources are being made available by WTO Members to
permit proper staffing of the panel proceedings. With limited or no budget growth
being urged by leading WTO Members, obvious tension exists between the high
number of disputes and the limited personnel within the WTO to staff the cases.
The following charts provide an overview of the disputes that have made their
way through the system thus far and of those disputes that are presently in the
system, including the parties and third parties to the dispute.
5. United States- The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, WT/DS38, at WTO Web-
site, supra note 3 [hereinafter Helms-Burton].
6. A panel was established on November 20, 1996. The parties agreed to suspend the panel
proceedings on April 25, 1997, WT/DS38/5.
7. United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58, at
WTO Website, supra note 3 (complaints by India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand) [hereinafter
Shrimp-Turtle].
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PANEL AND APPELLATE BODY DECISIONS
DISPUTE COMPLAINANT(S) THIRD PARTIES
United States-Standards for Brazil and Venezuela Australia, Canada, the
Reformulated Gas8  European Communities, and
Norway
Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic United States, European Norway (withdrew as third
Beverages 9  Communities, and Canada party on Nov. 7, 1995)
Brazil-Measures Affecting Philippines European Communities and
Desiccated Coconut 0  United States
United States-Restrictions on Costa Rica India
Imports of Cotton and
Man-Made Fibre Underwear"
United States-Measure India Canada, the European
Affecting Imports of Woven Communities, Norway,
Wool Shirts and Blouses from Pakistan and Turkey
India 2
Canada-Certain Measures United States
Concerning Periodicals
3
EC-Regime for the Guatemala, Honduras, Belize, Cameroon, Cote
Importation, Sale and Ecuador, Mexico, and United d'Ivore, Dominica,
Distribution of Bananas' 4  States Dominican Republic, Ghana,
Grenada, Jamaica, Saint





EC-Measures Concerning Canada Australia, New Zealand,
Meat and Meat Products Norway, and United States
(Hormones)' 5
8. United States-Standards for Reformulated Gas, WT/DS2, WT/DS4, at WTO Website,
supra note 3 (complaints by Brazil and Venezuela) Report of the Panel and Appellate Body adopted
on May 20, 1996 [hereinafter Reformulated Gas].
9. Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DSS, WT/DS 10, WT/DS 11, at WTO Website,
supra note 3 (complaints by the European Communities, Canada, and the United States) Report of
the Panel and Appellate Body adopted November 1, 1996 [hereinafter Japan-Liquor].
10. Brazil-Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut, WT/DS22, at WTO Website, supra note
3 (complaint by the Philippines) Report of the Panel and the Appellate Body adopted March 20,
1997 [hereinafter Brazil-Coconuts].
11. United States-Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-Made Fibre Underwear, WT/
DS24, at WTO Website, supra note 3 (complaint by Costa Rica) Report of the Panel and Appellate
Body adopted February 25, 1997 [hereinafter Costa Rica Underwear].
12. United States-Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses, WTDS33, at
WTO Website, supra note 3 (complaint by India) Report of the Panel and the Appellate Body adopted
May 23, 1997 [hereinafter India-Blouses].
13. Canada-Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, WT/DS31, at WTO Website, supra
note 3 (complaint by the United States) Report of the Panel and the Appellate Body adopted June
30, 1997 [hereinafter Canada-Split-Run].
14. EC-Bananas, supra note 3.
15. EC-Hormones, supra note 4, complaint by Canada.
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DISPUTE COMPLAINANT(S) THIRD PARTIES
EC-Measures Concerning United States Australia, Canada, New
Meat and Meat Products Zealand, and Norway
(Hormones) 
16





DISPUTE COMPLAINANT(S) THIRD PARTIES
Argentina-Measures United States European Communities,
Affecting Imports of Hungary, and India
Footwear, Textiles, Apparel,
and Other Items' 8
PANEL DECISIONS
DISPUTE COMPLAINANT(S) THIRD PARTIES
EC-Custom Classification of United States India, Japan, Korea, and
Certain Computer Singapore
Equipment 19









16. Id., complaint by the United States.
17. India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/
DS50, at WTO Website, supra note 3 (complaint by the United States) Report of the Panel circulated
September 5, 1997 (on appeal to the Appellate Body) [hereinafter India-Patents].
18. Argentina-Certain Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and Other
Items, WT/DS56, at WTO Website, supra note 3 (complaint by the United States) Report of the
Panel circulated November 25, 1997.
19. European Communities-Customs Classification of Certain Computer Equipment, WT/DS62,
at WTO Website, supra note 3 (complaint by the United States). The three disputes were decided
by the same panel. Report of the panel issued on February 5, 1998.
20. United Kingdom-Customs Classification of Certain Computer Equipment, WT/DS67, at
WTO Website, supra note 3 (complaint by the United States).
21. Ireland-Customs Classification of Certain Computer Equipment, WT/DS68, atWTO Web-
site, supra note 3 (complaint by the United States).
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DISPUTES IN THE PANEL PROCESS
DISPUTE COMPLAINANT(S) THIRD PARTIES
Japan-Measures Affecting United States European Communities and
Consumer Photographic Film Mexico
and Paper
22
United States-Import India, Malaysia, Pakistan, Australia, Colombia, Costa
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Thailand Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador,




Singapore, Sri Lanka, and
Venezuela
Guatemala-Anti-Dumping Mexico Canada, El Salvador,
Investigation Regarding Honduras, and United States
Imports of Portland Cement
from Mexico
24
Australia-Measures Canada European Communities,
Affecting the Importation of India, Norway, and United
Salmon 2' States
Indonesia-Certain Measures Japan, United States, and India, Korea, and United
Affecting the Automobile European Communities States
Industry
2 6




Korea-Taxes on Alcoholic European Communities and Canada and Mexico
Beverages 28  United States




22. Japan-Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, WT/DS44, at WTO
Website, supra note 3 (complaint by the United States) [hereinafter Japan-Film].
23. Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 7.
24. Guatemala-Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding Imports of Portland Cement from Mex-
ico, WT/DS60, at WTO Website, supra note 3 (complaint by Mexico).
25. Australia-Measures Affecting the Importation of Salmon, WT/DS18, at WTO Website,
supra note 3 (complaint by Canada).
26. Indonesia-Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, at WTO Website, supra
note 3 (WT/DS55, complaint by Japan; WT/DS64, complaint by Japan; WT/DS54, complaint by
the European Communities; WT/DS59, complaint by the United States).
27. European Communities-Measures Affecting the Importation of Certain Poultry, WT/DS69,
at WTO Website, supra note 3 (complaint by Brazil).
28. Korea-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, at WTO Website, supra note 3 (WT/DS75/1, com-
plaint by the European Communities; WT/DS84/1, complaint by the United States).
29. Argentina-Measures Affecting Textiles, Clothing and Footwear, WT/DS77/ l, at WTO Web-
site, supra note 3 (complaint by the European Communities).
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DISPUTE COMPLAINANT(S) THIRD PARTIES





Chile-Taxes on Alcoholic European Communities United States, Canada,
Beverages3' Mexico, and Peru
India-Quantitative United States New Zealand




Japan-Measures Affecting United States European Communities,
Agricultural Products3 3  Hungary, and Brazil






Australia-Subsidies Provided United States




DISPUTE COMPLAINANT(S) THIRD PARTIES
United States-The Cuban European Communities Canada, Japan, Malaysia,
Liberty and Democratic Mexico, and Thailand
Solidarity Act
37
30. India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/
DS79/1, at WTO Website, supra note 3 (complaint by the European Communities).
31. Chile-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS87/I, at WTO Website, supra note 3 (com-
plaint by the European Communities).
32. India-Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products,
WT/DS90/1, at WTO Website, supra note 3 (complaint by the United States).
33. Japan-Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, WT/DS76/I, at WTO Website, supra
note 3 (complaint by the United States).
34. European Communities-Measures Affecting Butter Products, WT/DS72, at WTO Website,
supra note 3 (complaint by New Zealand).
35. United States-Anti-Dumping Duty on Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors
(DRAMS) of One Megabyte or Above from Korea, WT/DS99, at WTO Website, supra note 3 (com-
plaint by Korea).
36. Australia-Subsidies Provided to Producers and Exporters of Automotive Leather, WT/
DS106, at WTO Website, supra note 3 (complaint by the United States).
37. Helms-Burton, supra note 5.
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IV. Whence the Panelists?
The large number of cases raises interesting questions as to the availability of
qualified panelists who can devote the time necessary for the proper conduct of
a given case. Any number of issues can determine whether prospective panelists
will be acceptable to countries involved in a panel proceeding. Familiarity with
the individual panelist and perception of ability to act independent of national
interests is an oft-repeated criterion by governments. Importance of the case may
dictate that very senior and well respected trade officials be selected. Strategically,
countries might prefer those with institutional knowledge or with knowledge of
the particular negotiating history of a provision or Agreement, someone who has
had responsibility for administering comparable laws in a different country, or
someone who is an outsider to the system altogether.
The rules of the DSU generally require that nationals of countries who are
parties to the dispute will not be used,38 eliminating in most cases a large pool
of potential panelists (e.g., the United States, Canada, and the EU are involved
in many of the disputes).
Moreover, historically, panelists have been selected in substantial part from
the members of Missions in Geneva. Such individuals are obviously known to
other Missions in the city and there are no travel or other expenses involved if
they serve as panelists. With the creation of the WTO, the number of Committees
and meetings held monthly has become breathtaking, while staff levels for individ-
ual countries have been reduced or only maintained in most instances. One would
think that drawing panelists from Missions in Geneva would be increasingly
difficult, although members of Missions indicate that the other work has not been
a basis for declining panel assignments to date.
Looking at the current track record, panelists are being regularly overturned
on appeal on a wide variety of issues. Whether such overturning reflects anything
other than the novelty of many of the issues and the youth of the WTO is not
38. Article 8 of the DSU sets out the rules for composition of panels.
1. Panels shall be composed of well-qualified governmental and/or non-governmental
individuals, including persons who have served on or presented a case to a panel,
served as a representative of a Member or of a contracting party to GATT 1947 or
as a representative to the Council or Committee of any covered agreement or its
predecessor agreement, or in the Secretariat, taught or published on international trade
law or policy, or served as a senior trade policy official of a Member. 2. Panel
members should be selected with a view to ensuring the independence of the members,
a sufficiently diverse background and a wide spectrum of experience. 3. Citizens of
Members whose governments are parties to the dispute or third parties as defined in
paragraph 2 of Article 10 shall not serve on a panel concerned with that dispute, unless
the parties to the dispute agree otherwise. (In the case where customs unions or common
markets are parties to a dispute, this provision applies to citizens of all member
countries of the customs unions or common markets.) (emphasis added).
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, art. 8, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol 31; 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
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clear. Would full-time panelists fare any better on appeal? Even if the answer
to this question is yes, would the results of panel decisions by full-time panelists
be as acceptable to Member countries? How could a change in the nature of the
panelists affect cost and who would pay?
The following charts provide the names of the chairman and the panelists in
disputes where a report has been issued and for disputes still in the panel process.
Summary information on the background and experience of the chairman and panel-
ists has also been included in the charts. Many of the panelists continue to be from
Geneva Missions, although a large number of government and former government
officials who served in Geneva in the past are also panelists. Private sector individuals,
including academics, and former GATT Secretariat personnel are also included.
PANELISTS-PANEL DECISIONS ISSUED
CHAIRMAN PANELIST
DISPUTE NATIONALITY/ PANELISTS NATIONALITY/
BACKGROUND BACKGROUND
Reformulated Gas Mr. Joseph Wong Mr. Crawford former Member of
Hong Kong Falconer New Zealand Mission
former Member of
Mr. Kim Luotonen Finland Mission
Japan-Liquor Mr. Hardeep Puri Mr. Luzius Wasescha Switzerland
India Mr. Hugh McPhail New Zealand/
Diplomat
Costa Rica Mr. Thomas Cottier Mr. Martin Harvey former Member of
Underwear Switzerland/Academic New Zealand Mission
Mr. Johannes Human former Member of
South Africa Mission
Brazil Coconuts Mr. Maamoun Abdel- Mr. Zdenck Jung Czech Republic
Fattah; Egypt/former Mr. Joseph Weiler Israel
Member of Mission
India Blouses Mr. Jacques Bourgois Mr. Robert Arnott Australia
EC/now in private Mr. Wilhelm Meier Mission of
practice Switzerland
Canada Split-Run Amb. Lars Anell Mr. Victor Luiz do Brazil-in Capital
Sweden/Brussels Prado
Amb. to EU Mr. Michael Reiterer Austria
EC-Bananas Mr. Stuart Harbinson Mr. Kym Anderson Australian/Economist
Hong Kong/ Mr. Christian Haberli Switzerland in Bern
Ambassador
EC-Hormones Mr. Thomas Cottier Mr. Jun Yakota Mission of Japan
Switzerland/Academic Mr. Peter Palecka Mission of Czech
Republic
India Patents Mr. Thomas Cottier Mr. Douglas Chester Australia
Switzerland/Academic Mr. Yangyong Thailand
Phuangrach
Argentina-Footwear Mr. Peter Palecka Ms. Heather Forton Mission of Canada
I Czech Republic Mr. Peter May Australia
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PANELISTS-DISPUTES CURRENTLY IN THE PANEL PROCESS
CHAIRMAN PANELIST
DISPUTE NATIONALITY/ PANELISTS NATIONALITY/
BACKGROUND BACKGROUND
Japan-Film Amb. William Mr. Adrian Macey New Zealand/
Rossier Ambassador to
Switzerland Mr. Victor Luiz do Thailand/former
Prado Member Mission of
Brazil
Helms-Burton Mr. Arthur Dunkel Mr. Tommy Koh Singapore
Switzerland/former Mr. Edward New Zealand
Director General of Woodfield
GATT
Shrimp-Turtle Mr. Michael Cartland Mr. Carlos Cozendey Brazil
Hong Kong Mr. Kilian Delbruck Mission of Germany
EC-LAN Mr. Crawford Mr. Ernesto de la Mission of Argentina
Falconer Guardia
New Zealand Mr. Carlos Antonio Mission of Brazil
da Rocha Paranhos
Guatemala-Cement Mr. Klaus Mr. Gerardo Teodoro Venezuela
Kautzor-Schroeder Thielen Graterol
Germany/Ret. GATT Mr. Jose Antonio S. Mission of the
Secretariat Buencamino Philippines
Indonesia-Autos Mr. Mohamed Mr. Ole Lundby Mission of Norway
Maamoun Mr. David John former Member
Abdel-Fattah Walker Mission of New
Egypt Zealand
Australia-Salmon Mr. Michael Cartland Mr. Kari Bergholm Sweden
Hong Kong Ms. Claudia Orozco Mission of Colombia
EC-Poultry Mr. Willhelm Meier Mr. Peter May Australia/Retired
Mission of Ms. Magda Shahin Egypt
Switzerland
Korea-Alcohol Mr. Ake Linden Professor Frederic Mission of France
Former WTO Official Jenny
Mr. Carlos Paranhos Mission of Brazil
Argentina-Textiles Mr. Peter Palecka Mr. Peter May Australia
Czech Republic Ms. Heather Forton Mission of Canada
India-Patent Mr. Stuart Harbinson Mr. Douglas Chester Australia
Protection Hong Kong/ Mr. Yanyong Thailand
Ambassador Phuangrach
Japan-Agricultural Mr. Kari Bergholm Mr. Germain Denis
Products Sweden Mr. Eirikur Einarsson
EC-Butter Mr. Attie Swart Mr. Robert Hudec United States/
Mission of South Ms. Claudia Orozco Professor
Africa Jaramillo Mission of Colombia
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V. Can the System Handle Complex and "Major" Cases?
Strict timelines for each stage of the dispute settlement process were added
to reduce the incentives for a party to delay resolution of disputes. How well
have the timelines worked? Can deviations from timelines be explained by the
complexity or the importance of the cases? The charts provided below suggest
that for early panel decisions, "major" cases and complex cases (as measured
by reports of "massive" records) generally take significantly longer. Against a
timeline of six months contained in article 12.8 of the DSU, from the time the
composition of the panel and terms of reference are agreed upon until final report,
three panels have been close (over six months but less than seven): Costa Rica
Underwear, India Blouses, and Brazil Coconuts; a number of panels have been
issued in between seven to nine months: Canada Split-Run, EC-Hormones (Can-
ada), India Patents, Argentina-Footwear, Japan-Liquor, Reformulated Gas,
and EC-LAN. Only three cases have taken more than one year: EC-Bananas,
EC-Hormones (United States), and Japan-Film.
The following chart provides the time taken by panels to issue reports from
the date that the composition and terms of reference of the panels were agreed
upon.
TIME TO DECISION
DISPUTE REFERENCE REPORT ISSUE DECISION TIME
TERMS DATE
Reformulated Gas April 28, 1995 January 29, 1996 9 months
Japan-Liquor October 30, 1995 July 11, 1996 8 months
Costa Rica April 19, 1996 November 8, 1996 6 months
Underwear
Brazil Coconuts April 16, 1996 October 17, 1996 6 months
India Blouses June 27, 1996 January 6, 1997 6 months
Canada Split-Run July 25, 1996 March 14, 1997 7 months
EC-Bananas June 7, 1996 August 11, 1997 14 months
EC-Hormones July 2, 1996 August 18, 1997 13 months
(United States)
EC-Hormones November 4, 1996 August 18, 1997 9 months
(Canada)
India Patents February 5, 1997 September 5, 1997 7 months
Argentina- April 4, 1997 November 25, 1997 7 months
Footwear
EC-LAN April 18, 1997 February 5, 1998 9 months
Japan-Film December 17, 1996 Interim Report 11 months
December 5, 1997
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Similarly, the period for establishing panels from the date that a request for
consultations is first made has been as short as one to two months to as long as
eighteen months.
TIME PERIOD FOR ESTABLISHING PANELS
DISPUTE DATE OF DATE OF DATE PANEL
REQUEST FOR REQUEST: WAS
CONSULTATIONS ESTABLISHMENT ESTABLISHED
OF A PANEL
Reformulated Gas April 10, 1995 May 19, 1995 May 31, 1995
Japan-Liquor June 21, 1995 September 14, 1995 September 27, 1995
Costa Rica December 22, 1995 February 22, 1996 March 5, 1996
Underwear
Brazil Coconuts November 27, 1995 February 5, 1996 March 5, 1996
India Blouses April and June 1995 March 14, 1996 April 17, 1996
(consultations
between the parties)
Canada Split-Run March 11, 1996 May 24, 1996 June 19, 1996
EC-Bananas February 5, 1996 April 11, 1996 May 8, 1996
EC-Hormones January 26, 1996 April 25, 1996 May 20, 1996
(United States)
EC-Hormones June 28, 1996 September 27, 1996 October 16, 1996
(Canada)
India Patents July 2, 1996 November 7, 1996 November 20, 1996
Argentina-Footwear October 4, 1996 January 9, 1997 February 25, 1997
Japan-Film June 13, 1996 September 20, 1996 October 16, 1996
Shrimp-Turtle October 8, 1996 February 25, 1997 April 10, 1997
EC-LAN November 8, 1996 February 11, 1997 February 25, 1997
Classification
UK-LAN February 14, 1997 March 7, 1997 March 20, 1997
Classification (incorporated with EC
panel)
Ireland-LAN February 14, 1997 March 7, 1997 March 20, 1997
Classification (incorporated with EC
panel)
Guatemala- October 15, 1996 February 4, 1997 March 20, 1997
Anti-Dumping
Investigation
Australia-Salmon October 5, 1995 March 7, 1997 April 10, 1997
Indonesia-Autos39  October 4, 1996 April 17, 1997 June 12, 1997
EC-Poultry February 24, 1997 June 12, 1997 July 30, 1997
Products
39. Complaints by Japan, EC, and the United States; the DSB established one panel to decide
the claims of the parties.
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DISPUTE DATE OF DATE OF DATE PANEL
REQUEST FOR REQUEST: WAS
CONSULTATIONS ESTABLISHMENT ESTABLISHED
OF A PANEL
Korea-Alcoholic April 4, 1997 September 10, 1997 October 16, 1997
Beverages
Argentina-Textiles, April 17, 1997 September 10, 1997 October 16, 1997
Clothing, and
Footwear
India-Patent April 28, 1997 September 9, 1997 October 16, 1997
Protection
Chile-Alcoholic June 4, 1997 October 3, 1997 November 18, 1997
Beverages
India-Agricultural July 15, 1997 October 3, 1997 November 18, 1997
Products
Japan-Agricultural April 7, 1997 October 3, 1997 November 18, 1997
Products
EC-Measures March 24, 1997 November 6, 1997 November 18, 1997
Affecting Butter
U.S.-Anti-Dumping August 14, 1997 January 16, 1998
Duty on DRAMS
Since Members have generally taken a relatively long time to implement
changes to conform to adverse panel decisions, the time from requesting consulta-
tions, through a panel and through the Appellate Body, and implementation of
changes can easily reach four years and may approach five years in certain matters.
Are such lengthy continuing delays until compliance is obtained acceptable to
Member nations or their businesses?
Some of the panel proceedings result in lengthy records being forwarded
to the panel. The Japan Film dispute is an example where the documentation
submitted as part of the dispute was reportedly more than 20,000 pages. The
girth of the record results in significant time delays and creates problems to
the extent documents need to be translated. The panel report is supposed to
be in excess of 500 pages, and while it has been distributed to the parties, it
had still not been circulated to other governments one month after release
because of the need to have the document translated into French and Spanish
before circulation.
VI. The Role of Experts
With the greatly expanded jurisdiction of the WTO, many disputes under the
WTO, particularly in certain areas, require assistance from experts. To date,
panels have requested such expertise when there is an issue before them that
involves the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Mea-
sures (SPS).
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Article 13.2 of the DSU states that:
Panels may seek information from any relevant source and may consult experts to obtain
their opinion on certain aspects of the matter. With respect to a factual issue, concerning
a scientific or other technical matter raised by a party to a dispute, a panel may request
an advisory report in writing from an expert review group. Rules for establishment of
such a group and its procedures are set forth in Appendix 4.
4
0
The Beef Hormones panel decision raises interesting questions about the use
of experts by panels. In Beef Hormones and in later cases under SPS, panels
have decided not to seek an advisory report to prevent time delays. Yet in Beef
Hormones the panel did seek the views of individual Members, just not an advisory
report. Is such use of experts really contemplated by article 13.2 of the DSU?
The Appellate Body said yes. Why would a panel ever seek an advisory report
in light of the Beef Hormones decision? Time will tell.
VII. Some Other Panel Issues
Obviously many important issues exist that have been addressed or that are
becoming of increasing importance in the working of panels. Only a few can be
addressed here.
Some early issues before the panels and Appellate Body dealt with burden of
proof and the role of GATT 1947 decisions. The resolution of these issues was
predictable. Just as under GATT practice, the party bringing an action has the
burden of making out a prima facie case of violation. Similarly, adopted GATT
panel reports can be referenced but are not controlling. Unadopted panel reports
are of no precedential value.
Other issues may be evolving at the WTO. These issues include the right to coun-
sel and whether amicus curiae briefs from non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) will be accepted and dealt with by panels. In the Bananas case, a third party
Member was not permitted to have retained counsel appear at the panel hearing on
its behalf. The issue was not subject to appeal because of the third party status of
the Member. However, the Appellate Body that was similarly asked to examine
whether private counsel could represent a Member took a different position for
Appellate Body activities. Various NGOs have significant interest in public access
to the WTO panel process, including the right to attend hearings, the right to submit
briefs, and the right to be heard. The Beef Hormones case raised the question of
whether an amicus curiae brief from an NGO would be rejected or somehow pre-
sented to the panel for consideration. The decision was made to submit the brief
to the panelists for whatever use they decided to make of it. Some WTO Member
governments are opposed to the receipt by the panelists of such briefs.
Finally, there has been an array of procedural issues where tweaking of the
DSU may be appropriate. One example is the lack of certainty as to the effect
40. DSU, supra note 38, art. 13.2.
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of not making a request for a panel in two consecutive DSB meetings. Where
a meeting or more intervenes after the first request, may the party opposing the
creation of a panel block its creation again? Some of these other issues and the
function of the Appellate Body are taken up in somewhat more detail below.
A. LEGAL VALUE OF ADOPTED GATT 1947 PANEL REPORTS
Article XVI: 1 of the WTO Agreement sets out that the WTO should be guided
by certain decisions and practices of the GATT 1947:
Except as otherwise provided under this Agreement or the Multilateral Trade
Agreements, the WTO shall be guided by the decisions, procedures and customary
practices followed by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947 and the bodies
established in the framework of GATT 1947.f
The Japan-Liquor dispute had been decided by a GATT 1947 dispute panel
in 1987 and adopted by the GATT Contracting Parties.42 Canada argued that
article XVI: 1 of the WTO Agreement provided "clear guidance to the panel and
the DSB respecting the legal value of reports adopted by the CONTRACTING
PARTIES under GATT 1947." In Canada's view the WTO panel should, at
a minimum, be directed by the 1987 panel report because it was particularly
authoritative with respect to the central issue of the dispute. 43
The United States disagreed with Canada. The position of the United States
was that panel reports under the GATT 1947 system were an "input for the
interpretative process, but not an independent source of binding norms."'
The panel decided according to the provisions of GATT 1994 and customary
rules of international law that adopted GATT 1947 panel reports would constitute
subsequent practice and should be considered by panels.
The issue was appealed to the Appellate Body, and after a review of the DSU
and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,45 specifically article 31, the
Appellate Body found the panel to be in error:
We do not believe that the CONTRACTING PARTIES, in deciding to adopt a panel
report, intended that their decision would constitute a definitive interpretation of the
relevant provisions of GATT 1947. Nor do we believe that this is contemplated under
GATT 1994. There is specific cause for this conclusion in the WTO Agreement.46
41. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-Multilateral Trade Negotiations (The Uruguay
Round): Agreement Establishing the Multilateral Trade Organization, art. XVI(1), Dec. 15, 1993,
33 I.L.M. 13 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
42. Japan-Customs Duties, Taxes, and Labeling Practices on Imported Wines and Alcoholic
Beverages, Nov. 10, 1987, GATT B.I.S.D. (34th Supp.) at 83 (1988) [hereinafter Japan-Liquor
1987].
43. Japan-Liquor, supra note 9, Report of the Panel at 13.
44. Id. at 14.
45. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (1969), 63 A.J.I.L.
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The Appellate Body concluded that adopted GATT 1947 Panel Reports did
not constitute subsequent practice in a specific case. In addition, the Appellate
Body concluded that unadopted panel reports have no legal status in the GATT
or the WTO system.47
B. BURDEN OF PROOF
One of the first issues that arises in the panel process is which party bears the
burden of proof concerning certain issues and in the dispute generally. This issue
was raised in both of the disputes concerning textiles. In the Costa Rica Underwear
case, the issue was one of burden of proof under the Agreement on Textiles and
Clothing (ATC).
The India Blouses dispute raised the issue of which party bears the burden of
proof when attempting to establish a violation. India claimed that under the ATC
the United States, the Member imposing the transitional safeguard measure, bore
the burden of proving that it had met the requirements of article 6 of the ATC.
The United States responded that the complaining party in any dispute bears the
burden of establishing a prima facie case of a violation.
The panel concluded that the party who initiates dispute settlement proceedings
must put forward factual and legal arguments to establish that the responding
party was acting inconsistent with its obligations under the particular agreement
or agreements at the center of the dispute. The Appellate Body agreed with the
panel.
The Appellate Body's ruling on burden of proof is not technically binding on
other parties in separate disputes. However, the ruling does establish how the
Appellate Body will decide if a complaining party has provided enough evidence
to prove their claim.
VIII. Functioning of the Appellate Body
To date, every panel decision has been appealed to the Appellate Body, although
actions by the United States indicate that the Japan-Film panel report will not
be appealed. With nearly all panel decisions being appealed to date, the adequacy
of a part-time Appellate Body is called into question. The complexity of many
of the disputes being appealed strains the time commitments made by the Appellate
Body members. In most cases the Appellate Body has had to review numerous
issues appealed by the parties. For example, the appeal of the EC-Bananas
panel report involved eighteen issues, described and addressed in over 1200 pages
in four panel reports.
When the Members undertake their review of the DSU in 1998, several Appel-
late Body issues will likely be raised. For example, the issue of whether to make
47. Id. at 14.
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Appellate Body membership a full-time, Geneva-based position is likely to be
raised. In addition, consideration may be given to increasing the size of the
Appellate Body staff. Some WTO Members remain concerned about the ability
of Appellate Body members to hear appeals in cases in which their countries are
parties. Hence, there may be efforts to establish conflicts standards or per se
prohibitions. Cost considerations of the current Appellate Body structure and
any effort to restrict participation in Appellate Body proceedings based on nation-
ality may lead to a reevaluation of the collegiality practice of the Appellate Body.
TIME TO DECISION FOR THE APPELLATE BODY
DISPUTE NOTICE OF DATE OF TIME TO
APPEAL APPELLATE DECISION
BODY DECISION
Reformulated Gas February 21, 1996 April 22, 1996 61 days
Japan-Liquor August 8, 1996 October 4, 1996 58 days
Costa Rica November 11, 1996 February 10, 1997 92 days
Underwear
Brazil Coconuts December 16, 1996 February 21, 1997 68 days
India Blouses February 24, 1997 April 25, 1997 61 days
Canada Split-Run April 29, 1997 June 30, 1997 63 days
EC-Bananas June 11, 1997 September 9, 1997 90 days
EC-Hormones September 24, 1997 January 16, 1998 114 days
India Patents October 15, 1997 December 19, 1997 65 days
IX. Flexibility Assumed to Conclude Disputes
An important issue that came up in the Canada Split-Run dispute was the ability
of the Appellate Body to decide an issue that may be beyond the "issue of law
covered in the panel report and the legal interpretations developed by the panel."
48
The Appellate Body was confronted with the issue of whether or not it could
review a factual determination made by the panel. The Canada Split-Run panel
decided that the products at issue were like-products for purposes of article III:
2 of GATT 1994. The Appellate Body, upon review of the panel's finding,
concluded that the panel failed to analyze the criteria set out in article 111:2 in
relation to split-run periodicals and domestic non-split-run periodicals.49
Because it was not obvious to the Appellate Body how the panel concluded
that the products were like-products, it reversed the legal findings and conclusions
of the panel with respect to that issue. Once it reversed the panel's findings with
respect to the like-product issue, the Appellate Body decided that it must determine
48. WTO Agreement, supra note 41.
49. Canada-Split-Run, supra note 13, Report of the Appellate Body at 21.
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the consistency of the Canadian measure (Excise Tax) with the second sentence
of article 111:2 of GATT 1994.50 The Appellate Body acknowledged that it was
constrained by articles 17.6 and 17.13 of the DSU:
We are mindful of the limitation of our mandate in Articles 17.6 and 17.13 of the DSU.
According to Article 17.6, an appeal shall be limited to issues of law covered in the
Panel Report and legal interpretations developed by the Panel. The determination of
whether imported and domestic products are "like products" is a process by which
legal rules have to be applied to facts. In any analysis of Article 111:2, first sentence,
this process is particularly delicate, since "likeness" must be construed narrowly and
on a case-by-case basis. We note that, due to the absence of adequate analysis in the
Panel Report in this respect, it is not possible to proceed to a determination of like
products. 1
The Government of Canada challenged the jurisdiction of the Appellate Body
to examine the claim under article 111:2, second sentence, because no party had
appealed the findings of the panel with respect to that issue. The Appellate Body
disagreed with Canada and concluded that it could and should complete the analy-
sis of article 11I:2 of GATT 1994:
We believe the Appellate Body can, and should, complete the analysis of Article III:
2 of the GATT 1994 in this case by examining the measure with reference to its consis-
tency with the second sentence of Article 111:2, provided there is sufficient basis in the
Panel Report to allow us to do so. 52
As the legal obligations in the first and second sentences are two closely-linked steps
in determining the consistency of an internal tax measure with the national treatment
obligations of Article 111:2, the Appellate Body would be remiss in not completing the
analysis of Article 111:2. In the case at hand, the Panel made legal findings and conclu-
sions concerning the first sentence of Article 111:2, and because we reverse one of those
findings, we need to develop our analysis based on the Panel Report in order to issue
legal conclusions with respect to Article 111:2, second sentence, of the GATT 1994. 53
Nothing in the DSU provides for a remand from the Appellate Body to the
panel when situations such as encountered in Canada Split-Run Periodicals arise.
Hence, the Appellate Body's construction of its authority under the DSU advanced
the conclusion of the disputes. If Members prefer a different procedure in this
type of situation, the 1998 DSU review will provide a vehicle to establish the
preferred procedure.
X. Right to Counsel
The right of Members to choose who will represent them in panel and Appellate
Body proceedings became an issue during the EC-Bananas dispute. Under the
GATT 1947 dispute settlement system, private lawyers commonly assisted gov-
50. Id. at 22.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 23.
53. Id. at 24.
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ernments in the preparation of their case. In fact if the parties did not object,
private attorneys could attend the proceedings. Because the only Members of
the WTO and its predecessor are governments and in light of the primary objective
of the DSU to permit the Members to reach a mutually acceptable solution, some
governments have taken the position that only members of the governments (not
the private sector and counsel) were allowed to appear before the panels.
During the EC-Bananas dispute, the Government of Saint Lucia, a Third
Party in the dispute, had its legal advisor who was not a full-time government
employee barred from participating in the panel proceedings.
At the beginning of the Panel's first substantive meeting on 10 September 1996, one
of the Complainants objected to the alleged presence of private lawyers in the Panel
meeting. In accordance with Article 12.1 of the DSU and the Working Procedures of
Appendix 3, we held consultations with the Complainants and the EC on this issue and
the Complainants expressed opposition to allowing private lawyers to be present.
We thereafter asked parties and third parties to observe the guidelines contained in our
working procedures and that only members of governments (including the European
Commission and an international civil servant of the ACP Secretariat) attend the Panel
meeting.54
Before the Appellate Body, Saint Lucia submitted reasons justifying the partici-
pation of its legal advisors in the oral hearing of the Appellate Body. Because
Saint Lucia was not a party to the dispute it had no right to appeal any issues,
including the barring of its counsel before the panel. Rather the sole issue for
the Appellate Body was whether it would allow Saint Lucia to have its legal
advisors participate at the oral hearing before the Appellate Body. Certain third
parties, including the Governments of Canada and Jamaica, supported Saint Lu-
cia's request.
The complaining parties argued that from the earliest years of the GATT only
government lawyers or trade experts made presentations to dispute settlement
panels and that the rules of international law governing diplomatic relations did
not support the proposition that a government could name whomever it wanted
as a member of its delegation to represent it in a foreign international body.55
In addition, the complaining parties pointed to article 27.2 of the DSU, which
provides that developing countries are entitled to legal assistance from the WTO
Secretariat in support of their argument that Saint Lucia was not permitted under
the DSU or rules of international law to have non-government lawyers represent
it before the panel or Appellate Body.
The Appellate Body, after consideration of all the arguments, allowed Saint
Lucia's request:
[We] find nothing in the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organiza-
tion (the WTO Agreement), the DSU or the Working Procedures, nor in customary
international law or the prevailing practice of international tribunals, which prevents
54. EC-Bananas, supra note 3, Report of the Panel at 275.
55. EC-Bananas, supra note 3, Report of the Appellate Body at 5.
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a WTO Member from determining the composition of its delegation in Appellate Body
proceedings. Having carefully considered the request made by the government of Saint
Lucia, and the responses dated 14 July 1997 received from Canada, Jamaica, Ecuador,
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and the United States, we rule that it is for a WTO
Member to decide who should represent it as members of its delegation in an oral
hearing of the Appellate Body.56
It is not clear whether the Appellate Body's decision will lead to a modification
in panel practice or whether Members will modify the DSU to clarify the issue
at the panel and/or Appellate Body stages.
XI. Private Sector Participation
Participation in WTO dispute settlement is currently limited to Member Gov-
ernments, although non-governmental entities have much at stake in the proceed-
ing and are often the instigators of government action. Moreover, private parties
often work with their government representatives in preparing cases that ulti-
mately are presented to panels and the Appellate Body. Also, there are public
interest groups and NGOs that have a significant interest in the disputes that
come before WTO panels and the Appellate Body.
Article 13 of the DSU grants panels the right to seek information and technical
advice:
Panels may seek information from any relevant source and may consult with experts
to obtain their opinion on certain aspects of the matter. With respect to a factual issue
concerning a scientific or other technical matter raised by a party to a dispute, a panel
may request an advisory report in writing from an expert review group. Rules for the
establishment of such a group and its procedures are set forth in Appendix 4.57
Submissions have been made by NGOs to panels in disputes.58 The World
Wide Fund for Nature, for example, submitted an amicus brief to the WTO
dispute panel on the Shrimp-Turtle dispute.59 The relative weight the panel gives
to such submissions, however, is not clear. Nor do WTO Member governments
agree that submissions or active participation by private entities be encouraged or
permitted. Consider the following argument presented by those opposing amicus
submissions: information submitted at the request of the panel from sources other
than the parties is specifically authorized by article 13.2; unsolicited information
provided by NGOs or other sources is not so authorized. Members generally
agree that panels have the authority under the DSU to request information from
any source and use that information when making their decisions. Theoretically,
a panel could seek information and not inform the parties. Hence, a panel could
decide a dispute in part based on information that the parties never had an opportu-
nity to consider or rebut.
56. Id. at 6.
57. DSU, supra note 38, art. 13(2).
58. EC-Hormones, supra note 4; Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 7.
59. WWF Amicus Brief to WTO Shrimp-Turtle Dispute (Sept. 1997).
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If WTO Members decide not to become involved in a dispute either as a party
or a third party, those Members have no right to submit information or make
arguments before the panel in that particular dispute. If NGOs or other non-parties
are allowed to submit unsolicited amicus briefs to panels, then it is argued that
those organizations or groups are being granted greater rights than WTO Mem-
bers. Allowing unsolicited amicus briefs would unfairly favor certain parties over
others in WTO disputes.
It is not clear whether members will attempt to clarify the rights of the private
sector during the DSU review in 1998. As some 1997 proposals for U.S. fast-track
legislation make clear, the public and NGOs will increase their call for greater
rights of participation.
XlI. Procedural Problems
Certain procedural problems in the DSU were identified in some of the first
disputes brought before panels and the Appellate Body. Some of these procedural
problems were the result of differing interpretations by Members over provisions
of the DSU. These problems were dealt with by the panels and in some cases
by the Appellate Body.
A. MULTIPLE PANEL REPORTS
In the EC-Bananas dispute there were five complaining parties: Honduras,
Guatemala, Mexico, Ecuador, and the United States. Because the five parties
submitted one panel request, the DSB established one panel to hear all the claims
of the parties and decide the dispute. The EC, pursuant to article 9.2 of the DSU,
requested that the panel "organize its examination and present its findings to the
DSB in such a manner that the rights, which the EC would have enjoyed had
separate panels examined the complaints, were in no way impaired.' 60 The panel
agreed to the EC's request and decided to issue four separate reports. Because
Guatemala and Honduras had filed a joint first submission, only one report would
be issued with respect to their claims. Although the complaining parties acknowl-
edged the EC's right to have separate reports under article 9 of the DSU, they
disagreed that separate reports were necessary to protect the rights the EC would
have enjoyed had there been separate proceedings. The complaining parties also
pointed to the administrative burden on the panel and the Secretariat and the
potential waste of resources.
The EC claimed that because the complaining parties were in "very diverse
legal positions," and because in its view the United States lacked a legal interest
in the dispute, separate panel reports were necessary.6
Little practical purpose is evident for the issuance of multiple panel reports
60. EC-Bananas, supra note 3, Report of the Panel at 12.
61. Id. at 13.
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even where multiple complainants do in fact raise very diverse issues with respect
to the same dispute. As the complaining parties pointed out in the EC-Bananas
dispute, the interests of the country being challenged can be protected in a panel
report by indicating which issues apply to which complainants. With continued
efforts by the United States, the EU, and others to hold the line in the WTO
budget into the future, there is no practical justification of wasting time and
resources producing multiple versions of the same panel report. Hopefully, this
issue can be addressed in the 1998 DSU review.
B. ADEQUACY OF PANEL REQUEST
After a complaining party completes the consultation phase of dispute settle-
ment without reaching a mutually satisfactory solution to the dispute, it can request
that a panel be established to decide the dispute. The DSU provides:
The request for the establishment of a panel shall be made in writing. It shall indicate
whether consultations were held, identify the specific measures at issue and provide a
brief summary of the legal basis of the complaint sufficient to present the problem
clearly. In case the applicant requests the establishment of a panel with other than
standard terms of reference, the written request shall include the proposed text of the
special terms of reference. 62
Article 6.2 of the DSU is the only guidance provided to parties regarding the
request for establishment of a panel, and it only provides the most basic of
instruction. The issue of what is required when requesting the establishment of
a panel arose in the EC-Bananas dispute. The EC argued that the request for
establishment of the panel was insufficient because the DSU requires that "a
specific measure be identified, which implies the mere identification of the legisla-
tion or regulations at issue is not sufficient, especially if they are broad and
extensive and if only specific aspects of them are being attacked." 63 In the EC's
view the complaining parties had not at the "very least" made a link between
the specific measure concerned and the specific agreement allegedly infringed. 64
The panel decided that the request for establishment of a panel was sufficient
and concluded that even if it was not, there was the possibility of curing the
deficiency:
We expressed the preliminary view that even if there was some uncertainty whether
the panel request had met the requirements of Article 6.2, the first written submissions of
the Complaintants "cured" that uncertainty because their submissions were sufficiently
detailed to present all the factual and legal issues clearly. We considered that at the
time that the EC filed its first written submission to the Panel, it had complete knowledge
of the Complainant's case through their submissions. In light of our analysis of the
panel request and Article 6.2 as outlined above, we confirm our preliminary view. 65
62. WTO Agreement, supra note 41, annex 2.
63. EC-Bananas, supra note 3, Report of the Appellate Body at 9.
64. Id.
65. EC-Bananas, supra note 3, Report of the Panel at 285 (footnote in original omitted).
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The Appellate Body agreed with the panel that the request for establishment
of the panel was sufficient but disagreed over the issue of the cure. As to the
question of the sufficiency of the panel request, the Appellate Body agreed with
the panel that the request need only be "[s]ufficiently specific to comply with
the minimum standards established by the terms of Article 6.2 of the DSU." 66
We accept the Panel's view that it was sufficient for the Complaining Parties to list
the provisions of the specific agreements alleged to have been violated without setting
out detailed arguments as to which specific aspects of the measures at issue relate to
which specific provisions of those agreements. In our view, there is a significant differ-
ence between the claims identified in the request for establishment of a panel, which
establish the panel's terms of reference under Article 7 of the DSU, and the arguments
supporting those claims, which are set out and progressively clarified in the first written
submissions, the rebuttal submissions and the first and second panel meetings with the
parties. 67
Because the DSB will not normally scrutinize a panel request, the Appellate
Body concluded that it is up to the panel to examine the request to ensure its
compliance with both "the letter and the spirit of Article 6.2 of the DSU." 68 As
to the issue of "cure", when a panel request may be deficient, the Appellate
Body concluded that if a claim is not specified in the request for establishment
of a panel, then the faulty request cannot be cured by the complaining party's
first written submission.69
C. REQUIREMENT OF LEGAL INTEREST
The EC questioned the "legal interest" of the United States in the Bananas
dispute. The EC claimed that the United States did not have a right to pursue
its claims concerning trade in goods because its banana production was minimal
and its exports were nil, and therefore it did not have the requisite legal interest
to pursue these claims.7 ° The complaining parties responded that the DSU did
not explicitly contain any such requirement.
The panel concluded that there was no "legal interest" requirement in the
DSU and the United States had a right to pursue its claim.
Thus, in our view a Member's potential interest in trade in goods or services and its
interest in a determination of rights and obligations under the WTO Agreement are
each sufficient to establish a right to pursue a WTO dispute settlement proceeding.
Moreover, we note that this result is consistent with decisions of international tribunals.
The EC appealed the issue to the Appellate Body. After reviewing the argu-
ments of the parties, the Appellate Body upheld the findings of the panel with
66. Id., Report of the Appellate Body at 62.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 63.
69. Id.
70. EC-Bananas, supra note 3, Report of the Panel at 286.
71. Id. at 287.
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respect to the issue. The Appellate Body concluded that a Member has "broad
discretion in deciding whether to bring a case against another Member under the
DSU. -
72
The language of Article XXIII: I of the GATT 1994 and of Article 3.7 of the DSU
suggests, furthermore, that a Member is expected to be largely self-regulating in deciding
whether any such action would be "fruitful". We are satisfied that the United States
was justified in bringing its claims under the GATT 1994 in this case. The United
States is a producer of bananas, and a potential export interest by the United States
cannot be excluded. The internal market of the United States for bananas could be
affected by the EC banana regime, in particular, by the effects of that regime on world
supplies and world prices of bananas.73
It is unclear what this ruling may mean for a Member pursuing claims where
a clear interest cannot be established.
D. ABILITY OF NEW MEMBERS OR ORIGINAL NON-PARTIES TO ADDRESS
SIMILAR GRIEVANCES STARTED AND RESOLVED PRIOR TO THEIR
ACCESSION TO THE WTO
When the EC-Bananas dispute was brought to the DSB, Panama was not a
Member of the WTO. Because Panama was not a WTO Member, it did not have
any right to participate in the proceedings, nor would it benefit from any settlement
between the parties or from the panels findings, except to the extent it could take
advantage of a new EC regime that was less burdensome than the one found to
be inconsistent with the EC's obligations. Specifically, Panama could not suspend
concessions nor could it require compensation from the EC as parties to the
proceedings could if the EC failed to bring its program into conformity. Nor
would Panama's rights necessarily be protected by the issues raised in the panel
proceeding.
After Panama joined the WTO on September 6, 1997, it requested consultations
with the EC on its regime for the importation, sale, and distribution of bananas
on October 24, 1997.74 The DSU does not identify how such situations should
be addressed or how countries which did not participate as third parties can gain
the benefits of panel reports other than through duplicative, sequential cases.
With nearly thirty countries seeking accession to the WTO at the beginning of
1998, Panama's challenge of the EC banana regime established a model for how
new Members must act to protect their interests in issues decided by prior panels.
Similarly, countries that do not pile on through third party status or parallel
actions may find themselves needing to bring sequential cases if the original
challenge is successful. With budget and time pressures facing Member countries
72. EC-Bananas, supra note 3, Report of the Appellate Body at 61.
73. Id.
74. European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/
DS105, at WTO Website, supra note 3 (complaint by Panama).
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and the Secretariat, it would make sense for options to be considered in the 1998
DSU review to make the process more cost effective for all Members.
E. CONSECUTIVE REQUESTS FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF A PANEL
Article 6.1 of the DSU sets out that a panel shall be established, at the latest,
at the DSB meeting following that at which the request first appears as an item
on the DSB's agenda. The DSU does not set out what happens if the requesting
party waits for a month before renewing its request for establishment of a panel.
To date, where a party objects, the second request is treated as a new request
and can be blocked by the party subject to the request.
F. TRANSPARENCY AND THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM
Historically, the GATT operated with very limited transparency. The Uruguay
Round Agreements, the WTO, and certain decisions by the WTO Members since
1995 have made some significant improvements in the level of transparency
particularly in the DSU. Nonetheless, much remains hidden from view: 1) tran-
scripts of the oral proceedings are not made available to the public; 2) private
parties cannot attend the hearings; 3) real parties in interest, (e.g., Eastman
Kodak and Fuji Film in the Japan-Film dispute) are only allowed to participate
to the extent their governments allow, and they have no right to submit briefs
with respect to certain issues that perhaps their governments refuse to pursue;
4) although panels have accepted, and in one case solicited, material from NGOs,
the existence of any rights for private parties remains highly controversial to
submit even amicus briefs in disputes; and 5) although the U.S. is required by
law to make submissions available to the public, other WTO Members have
sometimes not cooperated.
Allowing private parties access to submissions of the parties in dispute settle-
ment proceedings is an important aspect of increasing the transparency of the
WTO system. The DSU provides that upon request of a Member, a party to a
dispute shall provide a "non-confidential summary of the information contained
in its written submissions that could be disclosed to the public. -
75
The language of article 18 does not indicate that only parties to the dispute
may ask for public versions of submissions; rather, it states "upon request of a
Member." 76 Hopefully, this issue will be addressed during the 1998 review of
the DSU. With some controversial panel reports likely in 1998, the pressure on
the WTO for greater transparency will only increase.
75. DSU, supra note 38, art. 18(2).
76. Id.
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G. IMPLEMENTATION OF DECISIONS: MONITORING AND COMPLIANCE
Once the dispute settlement proceedings have concluded in a particular dispute,
the task of implementing the decision falls upon the Member found not in compli-
ance with its obligations. Implementation of decisions is an important part of
dispute settlement. The DSU sets out a period of fifteen months as the reasonable
time for implementation of recommendations and rulings of the DSB."
Article 21.3 of the DSU sets out that at a meeting of the DSB "held within
30 days after the date of adoption of the panel or Appellate Body report, the
Member concerned shall inform the DSB of its intentions in respect of implementa-
tion of the recommendations and rulings of the DSB." 78
In the Japan-Liquor dispute, the complaining parties complained that the
Japanese Government was not implementing the recommendation and rulings of
the DSB within the prescribed time periods. On November 20, 1996, Japan
informed the DSB of its intentions with respect to implementation of the DSB's
recommendations and rulings. Japan proposed that it would implement the deci-
sion in a "reasonable period of time" but would not specify the exact amount
of time involved.79 The complaining parties could not reach agreement with Japan
on what constituted a reasonable time. The United States requested that the matter
be decided through binding arbitration under article 21(3)(c) of the DSU. The
arbitrator decided that there was no reason to justify departing from the fifteen
month period set out in the DSU and therefore Japan had to comply with the
ruling within that time period. 80 The United States complied with the fifteen
month time period in the Reformulated Gas decision by providing its new Final
Rule to the WTO by August 20, 1997, one day before the fifteen month deadline. 8'
As more panel reports and Appellate Body decisions are adopted, the timelines
from requests for consultations to implementation of change will be better under-
stood. If the timeline is too long, look for renewed interest in what constitutes
a reasonable time for implementation.
XIII. Conclusion
In its first three years, the DSU generated a lot of interest, an outpouring of
requests for consultations, and the start of a body of panel reports and Appellate
Body decisions that should help Members begin to understand their rights and
obligations under the legally complex set of Agreements that make up the WTO.
77. DSU, supra note 38, art. 21(4).
78. WTO Agreement, supra note 41, annex 2.
79. Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Arbitration under Article 21 (3) (c) of the Understand-
ing on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes WT/DS8/15, WT/DS1O/15, WT/
DSI1/13 (Feb, 14, 1997), at WTO Website, supra note 3.
80. Id. at 9.
81. United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Status Report by
the United States, Addendum WT/DS2/10/Add.7 (Aug. 26, 1997), at WTO Website, supra note 3.
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Most Member governments have expressed general satisfaction with the DSB
and the panel and Appellate Body process generally. At the same time, a host
of procedural and construction issues have arisen that go to the heart of the
operation of the DSB. Some of these issues have been addressed in the foregoing
article. Other issues are suggested by the first three years activity: 1) has article
3.2 of the DSU been disregarded in some instances and have panels added to or
diminished rights provided in the covered agreements; 2) are certain cases too
big for the system to adequately handle due to the amount of information that
would have to be reviewed by the panel; 3) how will the system deal with cases
involving unilateral action (e.g., Japan-Autos); and 4) how should the system
deal with disputes where trade is a tangential issue (e.g., Helms-Burton).
With the DSB docket fully loaded, one can expect the list of hot issues to
continue to change regardless of clarifications that come out of the 1998 DSU
review.
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